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I
INTRODUCTION
The very foundation of our contract law is based upon the premise of the
bilateral voluntary exchange. In a market economy, such exchanges involve a
process in which the parties bargain voluntarily, each striving to maximize his
own economic advantage on terms that are acceptable to the other party.'
The presumption is that this process yields a "Pareto improvement" in which
at least one party is better off and neither party is worse off than would have
been the case without the exchange. 2 The same logic suggests that if the
parties to a contract should subsequently wish to modify it due to some
change in economic circumstances, unforeseen circumstances, or simply a
change of mind,3 then modifications freely entered into by both parties
should yield further Pareto improvement and should be enforceable. 4
However, a problem arises when one party to a contract agrees to a
proposed modification either because of expected dire consequences should
that party not agree to the modification or because the available remedies for
breach by the other party are inadequate to deter breach by the other party. 5
This point is emphasized by White and Summers, who note that not all
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I. As Adam Smith stated, man "must interest [others'] self-love in his favour, and show them
that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them." A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 19 (1776). See also E. FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS § 1.2, at 7 (1982).
2. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1.
3. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-6, at 54 (3d ed. 1988).
4. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE LJ. 52, 61 (1936);
Hartzler, The Business and Economic Functions of the Law of Contract Damages, 6 AM. Bus. UJ. 387, 392
(1968); Macneil, Contracts.- Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and
Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 854, 862 (1978).
5. As noted by Judge Posner in a recent decision:
It undermines the institution of contract to allow a contract party to use the threat of breach
to get the contract modified in his favor not because anything has happened to require
modification in the mutual interest of the parties but simply because the other party, unless
he knuckles under to the threat, will incur costs for which he will have no adequate legal
remedy. If contractual protections are illusory, people will be reluctant to make contracts.
Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983). See also Hillman, Policing
Contract Modifications under the UCC." Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOWA L. REV. 849,
880 n.152 (1979); Macneil, supra note 4.
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contract modifiers are honest. 6 "Some are extortionists, some are profiteers,
and some are chiselers."' 7 Similarly, Corbin coined the suggestive term "hold-
up game" in discussing the rationale for not enforcing a contract modification
involving extortion.8
The law recognizes that some modifications should be upheld because
they are entered into freely and some should be deemed unenforceable
because they derive from coercion or duress. 9 The problem is that there is a
very fine line between free but hard bargaining on the one hand and coercion
or duress on the other. The expanding use of duress as a justification for a
court's refusal to enforce contract modifications' has made it progressively
more difficult for parties vigorously engaged in bargaining over contract
modifications to know the current location of the fine line.'I
A number of commentators have analyzed this problem from the vantage
point of policing the bargaining process,' 2 while others have analyzed it in
terms of the fairness of the resulting exchange. 13 This article examines the
law of contract modification from a purely economic perspective. It offers an
economic explanation as to why the law enforces certain contract
modifications while refusing to enforce others. The analysis focuses on the
economic interpretation of the legal term "economic duress" (the hold-up
game), and on each party's objective circumstances at the time of the
proposed modification.
This economic analysis of the hold-up game posits the following:
6. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. Corbin uses this phrase to refer to the situation in which a party to a contract, through the
use of economic duress, forces the other party to agree to a contract modification. IA A. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 171, at 105 (1963).
9. See, e.g., Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941) (modification upheld
where a party agreed to excavate a cellar at a fixed price but unexpectedly encountered rock and
refused to proceed without an agreement by the owner to pay extra). This case was based on an
exception to the pre-existing duty rule, which is noted in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89
(1979): Modifications to contracts should be upheld even if not supported by consideration if the
modification is fair and equitable in view of the circumstances. See infra Part IV. But see Ruffin v.
Mercury Record Productions, Inc., 513 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975)
(oral promise to supplement salary made by employer to employee subsequent to employment
contract not enforceable for failure of consideration).
10. For a discussion of the expanding use of duress as a justification for denying enforcement of
a modification see E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.17, at 259-64.
11. As one commentator notes, as courts continue to expand the concept of duress, it has
become increasingly difficult to "define with precision the proper limits of bargaining." Id. § 4.17, at
262.
12. See e.g., Brody, Performance of a Pre-existing Contractual Duty as Consideration, 52 DEN. L.J. 433
(1975); Hillman, Contract Modification under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680
(1982); Hillman, A Study of Uniform Commercial Code Methodology: Contract Modification under Article Two,
59 N.C.L. REV. 335 (1981); Hillman, supra note 5, at 849; Mather, Contract Modification under Duress, 33
S.C.L. REV. 615 (1982). See also Roth Steel Products v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.
1983). As one commentator has noted, the Code approach to policing contract modifications does
not generally take into consideration the issue of whether the promisor was influenced by the
conduct of the promisee but rather whether the conduct of the promisor was in good or bad faith. In
contrast, the common law takes into consideration both the conduct of the promisee and the position
of the promisor. Hillman, supra note 5, at 849, 860.
13. Dawson, Economic Duress-An Essay in Perspective, 45 MICH. L. REV. 253, 289 (1947).
CONTRACT MODIFICATION
It is difficult or impossible for parties to a contract to place terms
within the initial contract limiting their subsequent ability to modify
the contract. Partly as a result, it is not uncommon for a party to a
contract to allege that an unanticipated change in circumstances has
occurred which makes it advantageous to breach and pay damages
rather than to perform as promised;
It is not uncommon for such statements to induce the other party
to agree to a modification of the original contract. When such a
statement is not factually accurate-it would not actually be more
advantageous for the party to breach and pay damages than to
perform-an "empty threat" has been made. The law is
understandably disinclined to enforce a modification obtained by
such means. By hypothesis, such a modification has no effect on the
action that the party making the empty threat would have actually
taken-the result is merely a transfer payment from one party to the
other not unlike robbery;
The absence of an empty threat is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for upholding a contract modification. 14 Even if both
parties voluntarily assent to a modification, with no apparent hint of
threat or coercion by the proposing party, the modification still must
be "fair" and "equitable" to be upheld.' 5  Thus, fairness
considerations are more complex in a legal setting than in an
economic setting: In the former, it is possible for the proposing
party to ask for too much, despite the other party's willingness to
pay, whereas in the latter, a modification is fair when it is mutually
beneficial, regardless of the degree of benefit received by each party.
The major questions that these facts pose for the economic analysis are the
following:
(1) Are available remedies inadequate to deter the hold-up game
and, if so, why?
(2) Is there an economic justification for a legal test based upon the
fairness of the modification? In particular, is it possible to view such a
test as setting a limit upon modifications that the parties would, at
the time of making the original contract, have found to be mutually
advantageous?
Our analysis concludes that the law correctly distinguishes between those
modifications that should be enforced and those that are subject to the hold-
up game and therefore unenforceable. The findings also confirm that the
scope of the term "economic duress" should properly be limited to empty
threats. 16 Specifically, the analysis shows that a policy of refusing to enforce
14. See, e.g., Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284 (1882); Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 91 N.H.
459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941).
15. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-203 (1977).
16. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.17, at 259-64 for a discussion of the extent to which the
term duress has been expanded by courts far beyond its origins.
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modifications based upon empty threats is consistent with the attainment of
economic efficiency and is not, therefore, an impediment to the bargaining
process. Drawing the line between hard bargaining and duress on an
economic basis has the additional advantage of being a clear one for the
courts as well as for the parties involved in contract modifications.
Remedies will be shown to provide inadequate protection from the hold-
up game. This inadequacy does not result from the inability of courts to
determine the correct damages or from any unwillingness of the courts to
enforce liquidated damage agreements; rather, it derives from the fact that
damages large enough to prevent the hold-up game may simply be too
expensive in terms of the incentives they provide for inefficient performance.
Lastly, it will be shown that the fairness test can be given an objective
economic justification as a limitation upon subsequent modifications that
would be regarded as mutually advantageous by the parties themselves at the
time of initial contracting. Viewed in this light, the fairness test provides
parameters for the original contract that are advantageous to both parties at
the time of initial contracting that they cannot specify themselves.
The next three sections review the numerous legal rules treating the
enforceability of contract modifications. The first examines the use of the
common law pre-existing duty rule, which nullifies all contract modifications
not supported by additional consideration, whether coerced or not. The next
sections examine the modification of the pre-existing duty rule under the
Uniform Commercial Code ("the Code") and under the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts ("the Restatement"). These sections are followed by a
discussion of the hold-up game. The article concludes with our economic
analysis of the hold-up game and a brief discussion of the results.
II
THE PRE-ExiSTING DUTY RULE
Historically, courts dealt with coercive contract modification by applying
the pre-existing duty rule.' 7 According to this rule, doing or promising what
a party is already legally bound to do is insufficient consideration for a new
promise.' 8 The rule has been applied to a variety of factual contexts,
including the promise of a debtor to pay less than the full amount due,' 9 the
promise of an owner to pay a contractor more for completion of
17. See, e.g., Rose v. Daniels, 8 R.I. 381 (1866) (agreement by a debtor with a creditor to
discharge the debt for a sum less than the amount due is unenforceable because it is not supported
by consideration); Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891)
(modification extorted by an architect from a brewery held to be unenforceable for failure of
additional consideration).
18. As Corbin states the rule: "[N]either the performance of duty nor the promise to render a
performance already required by duty is sufficient consideration for a return promise." IA A.
CORBIN, supra note 8, § 171, at 105. See also 2 A. SQUILLANTE &J. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES § 12-
2, at 3 (4th ed. 1974);J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-9, at 204 (3d ed. 1987).
19. Rose v. Daniels, 8 R.I. 381 (1866).
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construction, 20 a promise of an employer to pay more to an employee for his
work, 2' and a promise of a buyer to pay more to a seller for goods. 22
A classic example of the application of the rule is found in Alaska Packers'
Association v. Domenico.23  There, a number of seamen contracted with
Domenico to sail to Alaska to fish for salmon during the annual salmon run.
Subsequent to their arrival at the fishing grounds, the men refused to work
unless they were paid more for their labor than the parties had originally
agreed. Because it was impossible for Domenico to find other men, he agreed
to pay the additional rate demanded. Once the men returned to their home
port, Domenico refused to pay them the additional money. The court found
that the subsequent agreement to pay the men the additional monies was not
supported by consideration because the men had a pre-existing duty to
harvest the fish under the original contract. Thus, the subsequent agreement
was unenforceable.
This rule was originally widely accepted in the common law of the United
States.24 As suggested by Judge Posner, "[a]llowing contract modifications to
be voided in circumstances such as those in Alaska Packers' Association assures
prospective contract parties that signing a contract is not stepping into a trap,
and by thus encouraging people to make contracts promotes the efficient
allocation of resources." 25
While the rationale behind such an absolute rule is technically expressed
in terms of absence of consideration, some authorities suggest that the
justification for the rule really rests on the concern that the new promise by
the responding party may have been made under economic duress and
therefore should not be upheld.2 6 As previously noted, such situations are
characterized by Corbin as the hold-up game 27 and involve empty threats, that
20. Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., 103 Mo. 578, 15 S.W. 844 (1891).
21. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
22. Rexite Casting Co. v. Midwest Mower Corp., 267 S.W.2d 327 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954).
23. 117 F. 99 (9th Cir. 1902).
24. Ruffin v. Mercury Record Prods., Inc., 513 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914
(1975); Mobile Turnkey Housing, Inc. v. Ceafco, Inc., 294 Ala. 707, 321 So. 2d 186 (1975); Healy v.
Brewster, 59 Cal. 2d 455, 380 P.2d 817, 30 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1963); Dunn v. Utica Ins. Co., 108 Ga.
368, 133 S.E.2d 60 (1963); Insurance Agents, Inc. v. Abel, 338 N.W.2d 531 (Iowa App. 1983); Rudio
v. Yellowstone Merchandising Corp., 200 Mont. 537, 652 P.2d 1163 (1982); Schwartzreich v.
Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921). See also Patterson, An Apology for
Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 936 (1958).
25. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983).
26. IA A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 184, at 148-49. The thesis that the pre-existing duty rule is
concerned with the issue of duress is also suggested by Judge Posner in Selmer v. Blakeslee-Midwest
Co., 704 F.2d 924 (1983). See also Brody, supra note 12, at 435.
27. In explaining the rule, Corbin states:
Doubtless, also, there have been tough cases in which the promisor has been subjected to a
hold up game, so that he made his new promise under some degree of economic duress. It
is certainly possible that a contractor may bid low in order to get the contract, and then
refuse to perform, after it is too late to obtain another contractor without loss and
inconvenience, in order to induce a promise of more pay. The strict enforcement of the
supposed general rule would tend to remove this temptation from bidders, since they would
know that a promise so induced would not be legally enforceable.
IA A. CORBIN, supra note 8, at 105.
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is, attempts to exploit the contract responding party's lack of an adequate
legal remedy when no genuine dispute exists between the parties. Such
empty threats involve a promise to refrain from an action that would not have
been taken anyway. Since there is no detriment involved in promising not to
do what one would not have done anyway, and since there is no benefit to the
other party in obtaining what he would have obtained anyway, it is our
opinion that duress, when so viewed, is equivalent to a lack of consideration.
Although the pre-existing duty rule possesses the virtue of certainty (no
modifications will be allowed absent additional consideration), 28 the doctrine
has been criticized 29 as being both overinclusive and underinclusive. 30 It is
overinclusive to the extent that it represents a serious impediment to good
faith contract modifications. Because of its absoluteness, it fails to distinguish
between situations in which the party desiring modification is in fact playing.a
hold-up game and one in which such party is motivated by the discovery of
circumstances or the occurrence of unexpected events that makes his
performance far more burdensome than originally expected. 3' It is
underinclusive to the extent that even if bad faith or overreaching underlies
the party's desire to modify, if it is coupled with even the most modest form of
consideration, then the modification will be upheld.3 2
The pre-existing duty rule gradually lost favor with the courts as they
began to realize that it often produced an unfavorable result. Thus, courts
began to formulate a number of legal fictions to circumvent the rule. Using
one such fiction, a number of courts found that the rule was inapplicable to
situations in which the parties mutually rescinded the agreement prior to
execution of the new agreement. 33 Under this rationale, the new promise to
accept less or to pay more consideration would be supported by the other
28. See, e.g., IA A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 184, at 265, § 171, at 246; E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
1, § 4.21, at 274; Hillman, supra note 5, at 64.
29. As Corbin stated:
There has been a growing doubt as to the soundness of this doctrine as a matter of social
policy. In certain classes of cases, this doubt has influenced courts to refuse to apply the
rule, or to ignore it, in their actual decisions. Like other legal rules, the rule is in the
process of growth and change, the process being more active here than in most instances.
The result of this is that a court should no longer accept this rule as fully established.
IA A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 171, at 105.
30. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.21, at 274.
31. Compare, for example, the facts of Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir.
1902), with Davis & Co. v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 504, 43 S.E. 732 (1903). In the former case, workers
refused, without justification, to perform services under a contract with Alaska Packers' unless they
received additional compensation. In the latter case, Morgan, an employee of Davis & Co., received
a better job offer from another company. The employer offered to increase Morgan's compensation
in order to induce Morgan to remain at Davis & Co. This promise was later held to be unenforceable
for failure of consideration. These cases are also cited in E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.21, at 274
n.19.
32. Since courts generally do not inquire into the fairness of the consideration exchanged, even
a "horse, hawk or a robe" is sufficient consideration. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note I, § 4.21, at 274
(referencing language used by Lord Coke in Pinnel's Case, 5 Coke's Rep. at 117a-1 17b, 77 Eng. Rep.
at 237 (C.P. 1602)).
33. See, e.g., Martiniello v. Bamel, 255 Mass. 25, 150 N.E. 838 (1926); Schwartzreich v. Bauman-
Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
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party's renewed promise to perform the work originally agreed upon. These
courts were not generally concerned with the fairness of either the rescission
or the new contract. 34
Other courts circumvented the rule by finding that the responding party
had, through gift, waiver, or release, relieved the other party of his obligations
under the earlier contract. 35 As one commentator has noted,36 these efforts
to circumvent the pre-existing duty rule had a common inherent flaw: They
were based on the premise that one party wanted to release the other party
from any obligations before the parties entered into the second contract. In
point of fact, however, neither party intended that the other would have an
absolute right to avoid the contract.3 7
Still other courts attempted to avoid the unfairness of the pre-existing duty
rule by finding additional consideration to support the new promise.3 8 The
new consideration (or legal detriment) existed in the party desiring
modification's promise not to breach. Under this rationale, however, the new
consideration could always be found, thereby supporting enforcement of the
new promise in every case in which the rationale was applied. Even unfair or
coercive modifications would be upheld. In effect, this rationale conferred
upon the party desiring modification a right to breach, a notion that some
authorities have challenged. 3 9
Finally, some courts simply ignored the pre-existing duty rule and its
attendant requirement for new consideration in contract modifications by
creating an exception. These courts concluded that if the responding party
promised to pay an additional sum for the work, and if the demand by the
party seeking modification was based on unforeseen difficulties, then such a
modification without consideration would be enforceable. 40 As stated by one
court, this exception to the pre-existing duty rule should be limited to
instances "where the refusal to perform was equitable and fair, and the
difficulties were substantial, unforeseen and not within the contemplation of
the parties when the original contract was made."-4' The unforeseen
difficulties envisioned here presumably create circumstances in which it would
be better for the party desiring modification actually to breach than to
34. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.21, at 274.
35. See Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 91 N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941); Meech v. City of Buffalo, 29
N.Y. 198 (1864).
36. See Hillman, Contract iodification in Iowa-Recker v. Gustafson and the Resurrection of the
Preexisting Duty Doctrine, 65 IOWA L. REV. 343, 346-47 (1980).
37. Id.
38. See E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.21, at 275; Hillman, supra note 36, at 343, 347.
39. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 18, § 4-9, at 207;J. MURRAY, CONTRACTS 179 (1974);
but see O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 298-302 (1923).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 257 U.S. 523 (1922); Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 464 (Ct. CI. 1951); Mobile Turnkey Housing, Inc. v. Ceafco, Inc., 294
Ala. 707, 321 So. 2d 186 (1975); Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I. 482, 322 A.2d 630 (1974).
41. Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 233, 67 A. 286, 289 (1907); accord Watkins & Son v. Carrig, 91
N.H. 459, 21 A.2d 591 (1941). See also Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, 11 N.W. 284 (1882). This view
has been adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 89 (1981): "A promise modifying a
duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is binding... if the modification is fair and
equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made ...."
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perform as originally promised. To give up the legal right to breach in such
circumstances is clearly a detriment to the party desiring modification since it
involves forsaking the preferred course of action and should, in our view, be
regarded as additional consideration supporting the modification. The
refusal to perform is not an empty threat in such circumstances. Conversely,
if the unforeseen difficulties do not create circumstances in which the
requesting party would actually find it advantageous to breach rather than to
perform as originally promised, then giving up the right to breach is neither a
detriment to the party desiring modification nor a benefit to the responding
party and should not be regarded as additional consideration. Here the
refusal to perform is an empty threat. In this view, the unforeseen
circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule would not have been
necessary had courts adopted the proper empty threat test of consideration:
Would it have been in the party's best economic interest actually to make
good on the threat if concessions had not been obtained?
III
STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF THE PRE-EXISTING DUTY RULE
The Code does not require consideration as a predicate for the
enforceability of modifications of contracts involving goods.4 2 Under section
2-209 of the Code, "an agreement modifying a contract within this Article
needs no consideration to be binding." 43 In so providing, the creators of the
Code were acknowledging one of the fallacies of the pre-existing duty rule:
That without consideration, no contract modifications would be recognized,
whether coerced or made voluntarily by the parties.
Although the creators of the Code recognized the weaknesses inherent in
the pre-existing duty rule, they also recognized the legitimate concern raised
42. Obviating the requirement of consideration in contract modifications does not suggest that
such a requirement may also be dispensed with in the original agreement. The consideration
necessary to an original agreement serves to enforce the notion that the parties seriously and
voluntarily entered into the transaction and provides each with something in return for his promise.
See Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941); Hillman, supra note 36, at 344 n.6.
As explained in the case of Watkins & Son, Inc., 91 N.H. at 462, 21 A.2d at 593, the issue of
consideration in the contract modification context is entirely separate from that in the underlying
contract:
In common understanding there is, importantly, a wide divergence between a bare promise
and a promise in adjustment of a contractual promise already outstanding. A promise with
no supporting consideration would upset well and long-established human interrelations if
the law did not treat it as a vain thing. But parties to a valid contract generally understand
that it is subject to any mutual action they may take in its performance. Changes to meet
changes in circumstances and conditions should be valid if the law is to carry out its function
and service by rules conformable with reasonable practices and understandings in matters
of business and commerce.
But see G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 18-34 (1974).
43. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) comment 1 (1977) identifies the reason for this rule: "This section seeks
to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales contracts without
regard to the technicalities which presently hamper such adjustments."
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by the hold-up game which the rule tried to prevent. 44 The Code addresses
this issue in rather oblique fashion. There is no policing mechanism set forth
in section 2-209, but the comments to this section attempt to deal with the
problem of coercive modifications. Comment 2 to section 2-209 states that
"modifications made [under this section] must meet the test of good faith ....
The effective use of bad faith to escape performance on the original contract
terms is barred, and the extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate
commercial reason is ineffective as a violation of the duty of good faith. Nor
can a mere technical consideration support a modification made in bad
faith." 4 5
Although it is commendable to require that contract modifications be
made in good faith, the drafters of the Code left us with no clear
interpretation of the applicability of such a requirement to contract
modifications. There are two different Code definitions of good faith found in
other sections, and a Code definition of unconscionability, 46 all of which seem
to bear on the issue of good faith. Section 1-201(19) defines the term "good
faith" in relation to all transactions to which the Code applies: "Good faith
means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." 47 The test
under this section has been interpreted as a subjective one, known as "the
rule of the pure heart and the empty head." 48 However, a stricter, enhanced
definition is applied in the case of a merchant: Section 2-103(b) combines the
subjective test of honesty in fact with an objective test of "the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 49  The
objective part of the test is, as one court noted, 50 fairly straightforward. The
party seeking enforcement of the modification must show that his decision to
44. U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1977). The last sentence of this comment obviates one of the
problems raised by the pre-existing duty rule but which remains unsolved: If consideration exists,
but the modification was made in bad faith, then the bald presence of the consideration will not
support the modification. See generally Hillman, supra note 5, at 849.
45. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). Although this section will not be discussed, the text is set forth
below: "If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
46. The Uniform Commercial Code has a specific section which requires good faith in all Code
transactions. Section 1-203 states: "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement." Although this section does not apply to contract
formation, it does apply to contract modification which deals with "performance" under the contract.
J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 18, § 11-38, at 509. Further, the official comment to this section
points out that under the sales definition of good faith (§ 2-103), merchants not only have the
obligation of honesty in fact, but are also required to observe reasonable commercial standards of
fair dealing in the trade.
47. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1977).
48. Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code. 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812
(1958). A number of commentators have criticized the lack of an objective standard in this section.
See, e.g., Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 30 U. Cmi. L. REV. 666 (1963); Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REXV. 195, 208-16 (1968).
49. For a comprehensive examination of good faith under the Uniform Commercial Code, see
Hillman, supra note 5, at 849.
50. Roth Steel Products v. Sharno Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 146 (6th Cir. 1983).
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seek a modification was based on factors, such as increased costs, that would
cause an ordinary merchant to seek modification of the contract. The second
inquiry, regarding the subjective honesty of the party seeking modification, is
far more problematic, however. The burden is on the party asserting the
modification to show that he was, in fact, motivated by a legitimate
commercial reason and that such a reason is not offered as a mere pretext. 5 1
The court must determine whether the means used to obtain the modification
are an impermissible attempt to obtain a modification by extortion or
overreaching. 52
While White and Summers may be right that judges can use sections 1-203
and 2-302 on bad faith and unconscionability to police against the
extortionist, the profiteer, the chiseler, and the dishonest compromiser,
guidelines are far from clear. 53 The difficulty of interpreting and applying the
Code's definition of good faith is illustrated by the following hypothetical
situation: Suppose a merchant has a legitimate commercial reason for
demanding a price increase, but the amount he demands is excessive under
market conditions. Does comment 2 to section 2-209 require that his reason
for the modification be legitimate, or that the amount be legitimate, or
both?54 As one commentator has noted:
While the repudiation of the pre-existing duty doctrine in section 2-209(1) was a
major step, the issues and problems in determining the enforceability of modifications
are largely the same under the Code as at common law. At common law, fictions such
as waiver and mutual rescission used to avoid the pre-existing duty rule were
employed only when the courts were convinced that the modification was not a
product of overreaching. The Code approach to overreaching-the obligation of
good faith performance--cuts through the thicket of pre-existing duty and
consideration questions, but substitutes for that thicket one of its own: the meaning
and proper application of good faith. 5 5
Thus, section 2-209(1) provides for contract modification without the
requirement of additional consideration but only if two conditions are met.
First, the party desiring modification must demonstrate that he was acting in
good faith-that his request for a modification was based on a legitimate
commercial reason-and that such reason is not offered as a mere pretext to
extort a higher sum from the other party. This rule, as noted, does do away
with a number of problems presented by the restrictive pre-existing duty rule
but is not easy to apply because of the difficulty of interpreting the term
"good faith."
51. Ralston Purina Co. v. McNabb, 381 F. Supp. 181, 183 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
52. See Erie County Water Auth. v. Hen-Gar Constr., 473 F. Supp. 1310, 1313 (W.D.N.Y. 1979);
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 3, § 1-6, at 59-61.
53. See Hillman, supra note 5, at 849, 862.
54. For a discussion of the difficulty that courts have experienced in interpreting the "good
faith" standard under section 2-209, see generally Hillman, supra note 5, at 849.
55. Hillman, supra note 5, at 875-76.
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IV
FURTHER EROSION OF THE PRE-EXISTING DUTY RULE
Section 89 of the Restatement 56 has further eroded the common law
doctrine of the pre-existing duty rule. This section has been strongly
influenced by section 2-209 of the Code57 and, like the Code, permits
modification of contractual duties without consideration in the context of
modifications to an ongoing business transaction. Under the topic,
"Contracts Without Consideration," the Restatement provides: "A promise
modifying a duty under a contract not fully performed on either side is
binding (a) if the modification is fair and equitable in view of circumstances
not anticipated by the parties when the contract was made .... 58
The rationale for the Restatement approach appears to derive from the
common law "unanticipated circumstances" exception to the pre-existing
duty rule. 59 Comment b to section 89 of the Restatement elaborates on the
meaning of "circumstances not anticipated" by stating that an event, even if
foreseen as a remote possibility, may be unanticipated if it was not adequately
covered in the agreement. 60 This is not a satisfactory explanation of the term;
it is unclear how the section will be applied. The often cited case Angel v.
Murray6t relies on this very language in the Restatement to uphold a
modification without consideration. In that decision, Mr. Maher had entered
into a series of five-year contracts with the City of Newport to collect refuse.
Subsequent to entering into the final five-year contract for a stated sum, the
cost of refuse collection substantially increased owing to an unexpected and
unanticipated increase of the dwellings in the area by 400. Mr. Maher
thereafter requested a modification to the original contract whereby he would
receive an additional $10,000 for each of the remaining three years of the
contract. The city council agreed to this modification. Mr. Maher received
the additional monies for two of the remaining three years; after the second
56. This section first appeared as § 89D in the 1965 tentative draft of the Restatement (Second)
and was intended as an exception to the rule that "moral obligations" are not consideration for a
binding promise. See IA A. CORBIN, supra note 8, § 239, at 384 n.28 (criticizing overgenerality of pre-
section 89 rule). For the theoretical underpinnings of section 89, see Fuller, supra note 42, at 799,
806-10.
57. SeeJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 18, § 4-9, at 206.
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 (1981).
59. The following cases have adopted or recognized explicitly or implicitly the unanticipated
circumstances exception to the pre-existing duty rule. See, e.g., Wright & Pierce v. Wilmington, 290
F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1961); Frommeyer v. L. & R. Constr. Co., 261 F.2d 879 (3d Cir. 1958); Fran Realty,
Inc. v. Thomas, 30 Md. App. 362, 354 A.2d 196 (1976); Mobile Turnkey Housing, Inc. v. Ceafco,
Inc., 294 Ala. 707. 321 So. 2d 186 (1975); Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 206 Md. 610,
112 A.2d 901 (1955); Blakeslee v. Board of Water Comm'rs, 106 Conn. 642, 139 A.106 (1927); Linz
v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67 A. 286 (1907); King v. Duluth, M. & N.R. Co., 61 Minn. 482, 63 N.W.
1105 (1895); Goebel v. Linn, 47 Mich. 489, II N.W. 284 (1882).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 comment b (1981). One commentator has
suggested that the Restatement approach is more liberal in enforcing amendments than the similar
exception to the pre-existing duty rule in that it does not require that circumstances be unforeseen,
but only that they be unanticipated even if remotely foreseeable by the parties. See Mather, supra note
12, at 615, 619 n.16.
61. 113 R.I. 482, 322 A.2d 630 (1974).
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year, the citizens of Newport brought an action to compel him to return the
additional $20,000 which he had received. The Supreme Court of Rhode
Island expressly relied on section 89 of the Restatement 62 in finding that the
contract modification between Mr. Maher and the City of Newport should be
upheld. The court noted that the modern trend of the law is to enforce
agreements modifying contracts when "unexpected or unanticipated
difficulties arise during the course of the performance of a contract, even
though there is no consideration for the modification, as long as the parties
agree voluntarily. "63
It can be argued that the "unanticipated circumstances" of section 89 of
the Restatement can be equated with the "legitimate commercial reasons" of
Code section 2-209, discussed previously. 64  Similarly, the "fair and
equitable" requirement under section 89 has its parallel in Code section 2-
209 under the "good faith" standard. 65 The meaning of "fair and equitable"
in Restatement section 89 is elaborated upon in comment b, which states that
"[t]he limitation to a modification which is 'fair and equitable' goes beyond
absence of coercion and requires an objectively demonstrable reason for
seeking a modification." 66 Several courts have interpreted the language "fair
and equitable" to require an absence of coercion, duress, or extortion. 67
Similar to its statutory counterpart under the Code, section 2-209(1), the
Restatement alleviates a number of the problems found in the pre-existing
duty rule. In order for a contract modification to be enforceable if no
additional consideration has changed hands, several conditions must be met.
The request for the modification must be based on circumstances that were
unanticipated by the parties at the time of entering into the contract. Further,
the request for the modification must appear to the courts fair and equitable
in light of the circumstances.
V
THE HOLD-UP GAME
In examining the enforceability of contractual modifications without
consideration, the doctrine of economic duress6 8 must be considered in order
to analyze the enforceability of contracts subject to a hold-up game.6 9 With
the demise of the pre-existing duty rule and the increased acceptance of
62. Id. at 493-94, 322 A.2d at 636. At the time of the decision, the Restatement (Second) § 89
had not yet been adopted. The decision was therefore based on the draft section 89D.
63. Id.
64. See U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1977).
65. Id.
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89 comment b (1981).
67. See, e.g., Lowey v. Watt, 684 F.2d 957, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I.
482, 489-94, 322 A.2d 630, 630-37 (1974).
68. Duress may be defined as a threat or wrongful act which overcomes the free will of a party.
J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note 18, § 9-2, at 337. For a general discussion of economic duress
and its application to contract modifications, see Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REV.
254 (1942); Dawson, supra note 13; Hillman, supra note 5, at 849, 880-99.
69. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
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contract modifications not supported by additional consideration, the use of
the defense of duress to thwart a contract modification has gained increasing
judicial attention and interpretation. 70 Consider the following illustration. A
subcontractor has contracted with X to supply him with certain pipe. The
subcontractor, finding that the price of the pipe has risen to the extent that he
can no longer make a profit at the contract price, tells the contractor that he
refuses to perform unless he is paid the higher sum, Y. The contractor,
knowing that he cannot find the same pipe from another supplier in time to
meet his deadline with the owner, agrees to the subcontractor's terms. As
Posner notes, "[t]here is a practical argument against treating such a
statement as a threat: it will make an inference of duress inescapable in any
negotiation where one party makes an offer from which it refuses to budge,
for the other party will always be able to argue that he settled only because
there was a (figurative) gun at his head." 71 Indeed, older cases have held that
a threat not to honor a contract could not be considered duress. 72 However,
recent cases have held that a threat to breach the contract may constitute
economic duress if certain conditions prevail. 73 If the threat is deemed
wrongful and the responding party has no reasonable alternative or no
adequate legal or equitable remedy, then the threat may constitute duress.74
Both the Restatement and the Code address the issue of wrongful threat of
breach. Section 176(1)(d) of the Restatement states that a threat is improper
if "the threat is a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing under a
contract with a recipient." 75  Under the Code, as mentioned above, a
modification is judged in terms of "reasonable commercial standards of fair
70. See, e.g., First Data Resources, Inc. v. Omaha Steaks Int'l, Inc., 209 Neb. 327, 307 N.W.2d
790 (1981); Wurtz v. Fleischman, 97 Wis. 2d 100, 293 N.W.2d 155 (1980); Ross Systems v. Linden
Dari-Delite, Inc., 35 NJ. 329, 173 A.2d 258 (1961); Thompson Crane & Trucking Co. v. Eyman, 123
Cal. App. 2d 904, 267 P.2d 1043 (1954).
71. Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 927 (7th Cir. 1983).
72. See, e.g., Hartsville Oil Mill v. United States, 271 U.S. 43 (1926); Steinberg Press, Inc. v.
Charles Henry Publications, Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1947); Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal.
App. 2d 213, 124 P.2d 372 (1942). But see Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir.
1902).
73. See, e.g., Lowey v. Watt, 684 F.2d 957, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Angel v. Murray, 113 R.I.
482, 489-94, 322 A.2d 630, 630-37 (1974).
74. See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971), wherein the court held a contract voidable on the basis of duress:
A contract is voidable on the ground of duress when it is established that the party making
the claim was forced to agree to it by means of a wrongful threat .... However, a mere
threat by one party to breach the contract by not delivering the required items, though
wrongful, does not in itself constitute economic duress. It must also appear that the
threatened party could not obtain the goods from another source of supply and that the
ordinary remedy of an action for breach of contract would not be adequate.
Id. at 131-32, 272 N.E.2d at 535, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 25-26. See alsoJ. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, supra note
18, § 9-6, at 345-48; Dalzell, supra note 68, at 237, 341. The Code itself does not stipulate that a
threat to breach a contract leave the promisor with. no reasonable alternative, but, as one
commentator has noted, it would make sense to infer such a requirement. E. FARNSWORTH, supra
note I, § 4.22, at 278 n.9.
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 176(l)(d) (1981). Comment e to the Restatement
notes that "the extortion of a 'modification' without legitimate commercial reason is ineffective as a
violation of the duty of good faith . . . . The test of 'good faith' between merchants or as against
merchants includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade
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dealing in the trade" and in terms of the legitimate commercial rationale for
the modification. 76
On the other hand, "hard bargaining between experienced adversaries
ought not to be discouraged."-77 Courts have held that a responding party
may be held to his bargain even if agreed to under adverse circumstances so
long as the contract is in fact shaped by prevailing market forces. 78 The key,
as suggested by the Restatement, is whether "what is threatened is ... a use of
power for illegitimate ends." 79 Thus, at issue is the fairness of the terms of
the modification.
The law will accommodate the parties to a contract who seek a
modification. However, a court will enforce the modification only if the court
is satisfied that the party seeking modification is not engaging in a hold-up
game; the modification will be enforced only if the refusal to perform is not an
empty threat, and the modification is fair and equitable in light of the
circumstances surrounding the transaction. It is the duty of the court to
determine which contract modifications were freely entered into and which
were a product of the hold-up game.
VI
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
We now turn to an economic analysis of the hold-up game. As noted in
the Introduction, the major questions to be answered are the following:
(1) Are available remedies inadequate to deter the hold-up game
and, if so, why?
(2) Is there an economic justification for a legal test based upon the
fairness of the modification? In particular, is it possible to view such a
test as setting a limit upon modifications that the parties would, at
the time of making the original contract, have found to be mutually
advantageous?
Answers to these questions would ideally be consistent with
several other facts:
- The legal importance of unanticipated events suggests,
at a minimum, that some uncertainty exists at the time of
contracting which is resolved prior to the time at which
performance is supposed to be completed.
(section 2-103), and may in some situations require an objectively demonstrable reason for seeking a
modification." Id. comment e (quoting U.C.C. § 2-209).
76. U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 2 (1977).
77. E. FARNSWORTH, supra note 1, § 4.17, at 263.
78. Id.; see, e.g., Carpenter Paper Co. v, Kearney Hub Publishing Co., 163 Neb. 145, 78 N.W.2d
80 (1956). The court found that the promise was not unenforceable based on the theory of
economic duress because the promisee merely sought to handle the contract on a more profitable
basis and had a perfect right to do so "if, in doing so, it did not make unjust demands upon
[promisor] in view of all the circumstances then existing." Id. at 152, 78 N.W.2d at 84. See also
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289 (1942); Standard Box Co. v. Mutual Biscuit
Co., 10 Cal. App. 746, 103 P. 938 (1909).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176(2)(c) (1981).
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- Behavior of the parties in the modification-performance
and litigation stages is apparently characterized by mixed
strategies. Parties who have agreed to modifications do not
uniformly sue to have them set aside. And parties who
request modifications are only sometimes justified by
changes in their circumstances.
- For an empty threat to be effective (that is, believable),
the fact that it would not be advantageous to the party
making the threat must not be known to the other party-
there must be an information asymmetry for such behavior
to be a (sub-game perfect) equilibrium.
We now turn to an examination of a simple game whose equilibrium is
consistent with the stylized facts and which provides some interesting answers
to the above questions. Imagine for concreteness a service contract between a
risk-neutral buyer and a risk-neutral seller. At the time of contracting it is
common knowledge that the value of the service to the buyer is a random
variable that will, for simplicity, either be high, Vh, or low, vj, where Vh > v1 >
0. It is also common knowledge that the "reliance loss" that the buyer will
suffer should the seller not perform is another random variable that will either
be high, rh, or low, ri, where rh < rl < 0. The probability that the buyer will
experience the state (vi, r,) will be denoted pij > 0 for i,j = 1,h. Finally, it is
common knowledge that the cost to the seller of performing is an
independent random variable that will either be high, Ch, or low, c1 , with
probabilities q > 0 k=lh, respectively, where Ch < c1 < 0.
The timing of the game is as follows:
Contract -. Information Revealed -, Modification and/or
Performance -* Litigation
First, the parties enter into a contract. After contracting but prior to
completion of performance, information regarding the actual realizations of
the random variables is given to the parties. Next, the parties have an
opportunity for modification and completion of performance and finally an
opportunity for litigation.
Whether or not it would actually be efficient for the seller to perform in
state (v,, rj, Ck) depends upon whether or not the joint payoff to completion of
performance v, +Ck, exceeds the joint payoff to not completing performance,
r
. 
Let P denote the states in which performance is efficient:
P =- f(ij,k)Iv, + Ck > rj I.
Whether the buyer and seller can achieve an efficient outcome depends, of
course, on the information that becomes available to each in the course of the
game. In the "information revealed" stage, it is assumed, at a minimum, that
seller learns the actual value of c and the buyer learns the actual values of v
and r. In this "minimum information" setting the seller's actual cost is private
information to the seller-known only to the seller-and the actual value of
the service and reliance loss are private information to the buyer.
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A. When Only One Party Has Private Information
Two more informative cases provide a useful benchmark for subsequent
analysis:
(1) Only the buyer's information is private-it is common
knowledge that the buyer learns the value of v, r, and c and the seller
only learns c.
(2) Only the seller's information is private-it is common
knowledge that the seller learns the value of v, r, and c and the buyer
only learns v and r.
Consider Case 1 and an option contract in which the buyer has an option of
offering a bonus to the seller at the time of performance equal to either 0, -cl
>0, or -Ch >0. The seller is free either to accept the bonus and perform or
to reject the bonus and not perform. Note that the buyer must offer the seller
a minimum of b = -Ck to induce the seller to perform in state (v,, r, C A). Given
this constraint the buyer can do no better than to adopt the following strategy
regarding the bonus, biiA, offered in state (v,, r, cA):
( -Ck if(i,j,k) E P
bjA 0 otherwise
The seller can do no better than to respond by accepting (and performing)
when b=--j k > 0 and not performing when b=j h =0. This equilibrium is (full
information) Pareto efficient. 80 The initial price of the option contract can be
used to distribute the gains between the parties.
Case 2 is symmetric. Here the option contract offers the seller a chance to
demand a bonus for performing equal to either o0 or v, -r,, for i,j = l,h. The
buyer is free either to accept the demand-pay the bonus and receive the
value of performance-or to reject the demand and receive the reliance loss
associated with no performance. Here the seller must demand a maximum of
vi -rj to induce the buyer to accept in state (vi, rj, CA). Given this constraint
the seller can do no better that to adopt the strategy:
Sv, - rj if(i,j,k) E P
00 otherwise.
The buyer can do no better than to accept when b is finite and reject other-
wise. This equilibrium is again (full information) Pareto efficient and the ini-
tial price of the contract can once again be used to distribute the gains
between the parties. Full information Pareto efficient outcomes are possible when only
one party is privately informed.
Note that in both cases the game's description contains a provision analo-
gous to the ability of the parties to limit their subsequent ability to modify the
original contract. It is assumed, for example, in Case 1 that it is not possible
for the seller to wait for the buyer's offer and then ask for more. Were this
possible the seller might be inclined to reject the buyer's offer and threaten
80. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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not to perform unless paid an amount equal to the expected value of v-r
given that v-r > ch. Such a threat, however, would not be credible to the
buyer who knows the seller's actual cost and knows, therefore, that it would
not be rational for the seller actually to carry out such a threat. For such a
hold-up game to be possible, asymmetric information is not sufficient-both
parties must have private information.
B. When Both Parties Have Private Information
The interesting case and the focal one for our examination of the hold-up
game is the one in which both parties have private information-the minimum
information setting described above. Suppose initially that the contract
specifies a "liquidated damages" payment d to be paid by the seller to the
buyer if the contract is not modified and if the seller does not perform.
Furthermore, the contract specifies that the seller may, at his option, demand
a bonus payment b for performing. The buyer has the right to reject this
"modification" and insist upon the terms of the original contract. Should the
buyer accept the modification, the buyer retains the right to "litigate" which,
for our purposes, means that the buyer can demand an audit, which requires
an expenditure of a from each party. The outcome of this audit is that the
private information of both parties becomes public. The collective
expenditure of 2a can be regarded as the price of making the private
information verifiable. Should litigation occur the bonus payment will only be
made if costs were, in fact, high. The idea is that the seller should demand the
bonus only when justified, that is, when costs are high. This is, of course, not
verifiable unless litigation occurs.
The partial tree illustrated in Figure 1 describes that part of the game
corresponding to state (v, ,rj,ck).
FIGURE 1




State: (ij, k) - Pay damages -(r, + d, -d)
- Modify Accept Modification - (v, b, c, + b)
ifk =h (v, -b-a,ch+b-a)
LitigateL
ifk =I (u, - a, cl - a)
The parties to this situation realize that the initial choice of the contract
terms for damages, d, and bonus, b, define the game that they will
subsequently play. Since each can expect no more than the equilibrium payoff
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in this game and since the price of the contract is a remaining term which can
be used to redistribute the sum of these expected gains in any way the parties
wish, we may regard the players as having substantially the same interests as
regards the choice of d and b: making the expected joint payoff from the
resulting game as large as possible.
Given these terms, the seller who learns that costs are ck, k=1, h must
choose a probability Ilk of modifying (demanding the bonus) and an
associated probability (1-/k) of performing without modification. The buyer,
in turn, who learns that value and reliance loss are (vi,r) i,j = 1,h and that the
seller wishes to modify must choose a probability of rejecting the
modification, pi,, a probability of accepting the modification, at,, and an
associated probability of litigating A.ij = 1 - pij - aij.
The relevance of the seller's choice for the buyer is as follows. Since the
seller will modify with a probability of
Pm = qqtI + qhILh
it follows that the probability that the seller is bluffing-actually has low costs-
given that the seller asks for a modification is
PB = qdt +
qhIlh 
.
Similarly, the buyer will reject the proposed modification (call) with
probability (summing over all possible value and reliance loss states)
PR = Pjpj
J j
will accept the proposed modification (fold) with probability
PA. = pjj
i j




Should the seller modify and the buyer reject, the seller has the remaining
choice of whether to perform or not to perform and pay damages d. Clearly
the seller will choose to perform when -d < cA, and not to perform when -d
>ck, that is, when paying damages is relatively worse. We assume that ties are
resolved in the buyer's favor so that if -d=ck (the seller reports he is
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indifferent between performing and paying damages), then the seller will
perform if vi >rj +d and not perform if v, < rj +d. The payoff to the buyer
should the seller modify and the buyer reject is
vi if -d < c
eiLJk max vi,rj + d if-d =c
r + d if-d > ck.
The result of these strategy choices is that the buyer who finds himself in
state (vi, rj) will receive an expected payoff of
I iB = p.4 [pij R ij + CijAij + AjLij I + (1 - PM)Vi
where
Rij PBO!ij + (1 - PB)Oijh
Aij vi - b
Lij PB(Vi - a) + (1- PB)(vi - b - a).
In the expression IB, Rj represents the buyer's expected payoff should the
seller modify and the buyer reject, ALj should the seller modify and the buyer
accept, and Lij should the seller modify and the buyer litigate. The Vij term
represents the buyer's payoff should the seller perform without modification.
Each of these four terms is multiplied by its probability to determine the total
expected payoff to the buyer.
Similarly, the seller who finds himself in state cA will receive an expected
payoff of
fIS = [LkMk + (1 - /A)Ck
where
MI = pR maxf-dc, I + p,(c1 + b) + PL(CI - a)
Mh = PR max{ -dch I + PA(ch + b) + PL(Ch + b - a).
In the expression Us , Mk represents the seller's expected payoff should he
modify, and Ck should he perform without modification.
Since, given (b,d), each party will choose probabilities to maximize his own
expected payoff given the probabilities chosen by the other party, we have the
following conditions for the seller's choice of probabilities to modify:
M, > c1 =: p.l = 1
M, = c, =0 <it, < 0
M, < c, =>pa = 0O.
and
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Mh > ChA= h = 1
Mh = ch= O> 0.< h< 1
Mh < Ch = Ph = 0.
Together with the following conditions for the buyer's choice of probabilities
to reject, accept, or litigate:
pij = 1
Rij > Aij, Lij aij = 0
=ij 0
(Pij = 0
Aij > Rij, Lij = aij = I
ij = 0
1pj = 0
Lij > Aij, Rij z=> aij = 0
1 ij = I
R 1= Aij > Lij z pij -+- aij = 
1
Aij = 0
Rij =' Lij > Aij => pij + 1i
I ij = 0
Aij = ij > Rij => pij =0
1aij + Aij = I
Rij = Aij = Lij =:> pij + aij + "ij 1.
We may now explore the consequences of particular choices for the terms
(d,b). To provide for an interesting range of possibilities, suppose that the
states in which performance is efficient are
P = 1 (1,h,l1), (h,1,1), (h, h,l1), (h, h, h)
so that it is never efficient to perform when both value and reliance are low,
and it is only efficient to perform when costs are high if both value and reliance
are high. In this setting, a natural candidate is the marginal cost pricing contract
(d,b) = (-c1, - Ch + c1 )
which is analogous to the "only the buyer's information is private" option
contract discussed above.
Since c, = -d and ch = -b-d, the fact that vi + ck < , for (i,j,k) P can
be expressed as
v, < r, + d for (i,j,k) = (1,1,1) or (1,l,h)
v- b < rh + d for (i,j,k ) = (l,h,h)
Vh - < K r, + d for (i,j,k) = (h,l,h).
It follows from the first inequality that R11 = r, + d > v, > AlbL, or thatp, = 1
and all = All = 0. It follows from the second that
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(Rth) = PBVI + (1 - pB)(rh + d)
> pB(vt - a) + (1 - PB) (v,- b - a) = Lth
> v, - b = Alh.
Thus, plh = phl = 1, ath, = ahl = 0, and A)lh =A = 0. The buyer rejects
modifications unless both valuation and reliance are high. Notice that this choice is
independent of the seller's and is thus a dominant strategy.
Since b - a = -ch + c1 - a > 0, it follows that ch + b - a > Ch. Also,
since -d = cl > ch, we have Mh > ch and thus [th = 1. The seller will always
request the modification when costs are high. This result is also independent of the
buyer's choice and thus also a dominant strategy.
It remains necessary to consider the choices of the low-cost seller and the
high-valuation, high-reliance buyer-the most likely setting for the hold-up
game. If equilibrium entails a mixed strategy in which I > 0 then M, = cl or
PL(Cl - a) = PA(C - b) or
pLa = pAb
which requires, if PL,p4 > 0, that Ahh = Lhh > Rhh or that PB = a/b. This









In this graph PB < q, is plotted on the horizontal axis and Rh, Ah and Lhh on
the vertical axis. This graph incorporates several features suggestive of the
hold-up game:
(1) A relatively high probability of low costs qi;
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(2) A relatively small cost of litigating a;
(3) A relatively large "high reliance" cost so that rh + d is small
relative to Vh - b and Vh - b - a. In these circumstances the










This equilibrium is interesting for a variety of reasons. Note to begin with
that performance occurs in state (i,j,k) if and only if (i,j,k) e P - the contract
thus induces efficient performance. The only departure from a full
information Pareto efficient outcome, in fact, is the expected cost of litigation.
This outcome is predicated upon rules for the game which mirror the law in
not enforcing modifications based upon duress, that is, an empty threat to
take an action which would not, in fact, be advantageous to the person making
the threat. The equilibrium also involves mixed strategies consistent with the
stylized facts mentioned earlier in which the probability of bluffing is neither
zero nor one and the probability of litigating is neither zero nor one. Last, the
equilibrium suggests the following answers to the two major questions posed
by the hold-up game:
(1) Why are available remedies inadequate as a protection against
the hold-up game? The use of a sufficiently larger damages term, d
(a more adequate remedy), would affect the equilibrium by making
rejection a better alternative for the high value, high reliance buyer
than litigation. However, the use of such a large damage term also
induces inefficient performance. It is thus possible that the parties
themselves would not find it in their interest to choose a large
enough damage term to preclude the hold-up game. A modification
of the basic game is also possible in which the buyer would decide
whether to accept the goods being offered by the seller or to demand
a modification. This game would only reverse the roles of potential
robber and victim, and expose the seller to a hold-up game in which
the buyer sometimes falsely claims to be other than a high value,
high reliance type in order to extract cost-concessions from the
seller. Here again it is possible that the parties would not find it
advantageous to set a large enough liquidated damages term to
preclude this reversed hold-up game again because of the incentives
[Vol. 52: No. I
CONTRACT MODIFICATION
for inefficient performance. Liquidated damages thus cannot be
relied upon as a solution for the hold-up game.
(2) Is there an economic justification for a "fairness" test? The
specification of the game places a limit on the modification that can
be obtained-the seller can either ask for b or nothing. A small, ex
ante increase in b would have the following effect upon the solution.
As can be seen in Figure 2, both Ahh and the left-hand vertical
intercept of Lhh shift downward by an amount equal to the increase in
b. Provided the change in b is small enough, the intersection of Lhh
and Ahh will remain above Rhh which has not shifted. This is true for b
< b where b is the solution to:
b(rh + d) + a(vh - rh - d) = b(vh - b).
This increase in b reduces pB, pt, and ahh and increases A)hh. The
unconditional expected payoff to the buyer falls since flB is
unchanged for (ij) 5 (h,h) and
1Ah = (Vh - b).
The unconditional expected payoff to the seller increases, however,
since -Is is unchanged and
HS= -pl + (1 -PR)(h + b) -PLa
b
= --(1 Phh)d + Phh (Ch + b) -Phh aa+b
= -(1 -Phh)d +Phh Ch +a b
Routine calculation shows, moreover,
O(qhI S + p BHl) (1 - qh)b 2 + 2ab(1 - qh) + a2
b -(a + b)2
<0
Thus, the joint payoff falls with an increase in b-a consequence of the
increased likelihood of litigation. While it is inefficient to ask for a
high b, the seller has every incentive to do so since only high
valuation, high reliance buyers will accept the cost based
modification in any event and such a buyer would be willing in fact to
pay as much as b. Since the buyer loses more than the seller gains
there would be a basis for an exchange in which the buyer promises
not to ask for more-if this were possible. If it is not possible to
make such a promise believable, there is certainly scope for the law
to provide such a limitation ex ante in the form of a fairness test.
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VII
CONCLUSION
Our simple game-theoretic model has provided suggestive answers to the
major questions involving the hold-up games. A policy of refusing to enforce
modifications based upon empty threats was shown to be consistent with the
attainment of efficiency and not an impediment to bargaining over
modifications. Remedies were shown to be an inadequate protection from the
hold-up game because of the fact that damages large enough to prevent the
hold-up games may simply be too expensive in terms of the incentives they
provide for inefficient performance. Lastly, it was shown that a fairness test
could be given an objective economic justification as a limitation upon
subsequent modifications which would be regarded as mutually advantageous
by the parties themselves at the time of initial contracting. Viewed in this
light, the fairness test can be interpreted as providing those terms for the
original contract that would have been advantageous to both parties at the
time of initial contracting.
